



Intelligence Requirements for AT/FP in Littorals

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Nature of the Littorals



- Big cities
 - 80% of world capitals within 300 miles






Nature of the Littorals



- Big cities
- Large populations
 - 70% of worlds population within 200 miles





Nature of the Littorals



- **Big cities**
- **Large populations**
- **Trade route intersection**
 - **Includes nearly all international trade marketplaces**
 - **99% of world's foreign trade travels by sea**



Challenges to AT/FP



- **Anti-terrorism:**

“defensive measures to reduce vulnerability”

- **Force Protection:**

*“security programs designed to protect
Pers/Info/Fac/Equip the planned and integrated
application of CT, PhysSec, OpSec, PersProtect,
and ISR”*



Anti-terrorism



■ Port visits

- Lack of positive control over port
- Reliability of host nation security
- Vulnerability of services (food & water)



Anti-terrorism



- Port visits
- Liberty
 - Individual
 - Groups



Anti-terrorism



- Port visits
- Liberty
- Exercises



Force Protection



- **Quality and reliability of host nation security service**
 - **Corruption**
 - **Agendas**
 - **US policy**



Force Protection



- **Quality and reliability of host nation security service**
- **Quantity and reliability of CI/Intel databases**
 - **Insufficient data to predict or warn**
 - **Available data suspect**
 - **Separate databases**



Force Protection



- **Quality and reliability of host nation security service**
- **Quantity and reliability of CI/Intel databases**
- **Challenges to collection**
 - **Lack of HUMINT network**
 - **Lack of permanent US presence**
 - **Inability to penetrate infrastructure**
 - **Stolen documents/aliases**
 - **No permanent addresses**
 - **Excellent COMSEC (cell phones)**
 - **Frequent movement**



Potential Solutions



- **AT/FP is the Commander's responsibility**
 - **Must have responsibility and authority**
 - **Establish FP condition (security posture)**



Potential Solutions



■ Anti-terrorism

- Permanent AT LNO at AMEMB
- Establish FAST-like capability with each MEU
- In-harbor moorings vice pierside
- Conduct integrated (Ops/Intel) vulnerability assessments in advance
- Enhance FP condition checklist with random AT measure (RAMs)



Potential Solutions



■ Force Protection

- Expand permanent CI presence
 - NCIS
 - USMC CI
 - Use CI/HUMINT



Potential Solutions



■ Force Protection

- Expand permanent CI presence
- Consolidate and expand databases
 - CIA, FBI, INS, CG
 - Make databases interoperable/accessible



Potential Solutions



■ Force Protection

- Expand permanent CI presence
- Consolidate and expand databases
- Formalize vigilance/access
- Incorporate link analysis tools into GCCS 1
- Refocus analytic effort



Improved System




- **Matrix approach removed**
 - **Focus on capability, activity, and intentions**
 - **Merge with operational environment to include DoD presence, host national support and political situation**
 - **Fuller incorporation of analytical assessment**



Operational Capability



- Focus on attack methods used by the group
 - Tactics used by the group
 - Mass casualty capability and willingness
 - Targeting of individuals or property
 - State sponsorship
 - High technology access
 - Methods of operations






Operational Capability



- Focus on attack methods used by the group
- Assessment of Group's overall professionalism
- Different tactics result in different degrees of threat





Intentions



- **Stated desire and/or actual history of attacking US interests**
- **Influencing elements**
 - **Recent substantial attacks**
 - **Anti-US ideology**
 - **Anti-host nation ideology**
 - **Attacks in other countries**
 - **Response to current international events**






Activity



- What the Group is doing in the country
- Influencing elements
 - Fund raising, safe haven
 - Suspected surveillance
 - Threats
 - Targeting pattern changes
 - Key operative movement
 - Contingency Planning
 - Disruption by US or Host Nation
 - Identification of Weapons Caches
 - Cell activity, operational or support
 - Credible indications of US targeting






Operating Environment



- **How the overall environment influences ability and motivation to attack**
- **Influencing Elements**
 - **DoD presence**
 - **Type, Size, Location, Duration**
 - **Terrorist Perception of Significance**
 - **Political Sensitivity**






Operating Environment



- How the overall environment influences ability and motivation to attack
- Influencing Elements
 - DoD presence
 - External influencing factors
 - War, Insurrection, etc






Operating Environment



- **How the overall environment influences ability and motivation to attack**
- **Influencing Elements**
 - **DoD presence**
 - **External influencing factors**
 - **Host nation security and level of cooperation**
 - **Political influences affecting motivation to attack**
 - **Assessment of reporting regarding activity in the country**



Terrorist Threat Level Tool

Warning




Terrorist Threat Level Tool

Warning





Risk Assessment





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